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ABSTRACT: This paper presents a conceptual view on development and its trans-
lation into development policies. It argues that society’s perception of development 
is structured by conventions, which provide a view of the past, present and future 
and, at the same time, allows a certain hierarchy of problems and solutions to such 
problems. The prevalence of a specific convention depends on the international 
conditions faced by this society and on the distribution of economic and political 
power within that society. Therefore, in complex societies there is always a struggle 
for hegemony between competing development conventions.
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RESUMO: O artigo apresenta uma visão conceitual do desenvolvimento e discute 
como essa visão se traduz em políticas públicas. Argumenta-se que a percepção do 
desenvolvimento em uma determinada sociedade é estruturada por convenções, que 
fornecem uma visão sobre o passado, o presente e o futuro e permite certa hierar-
quização de problemas e de soluções para esses problemas. A predominância de uma 
ou outra convenção depende das condições internacionais a que essa sociedade se 
encontra sujeita e também da distribuição de poder político e econômico dentro 
dessa sociedade. Logo, em sociedades completas, sempre existe uma disputa pela 
hegemonia entre diferentes convenções sobre o desenvolvimento.
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1. InTRODUCTIOn
Keynes’ remark about “practical men” being guided by ideas of long-dead economists is 
well known and goes a long way to explain this paper, which is part of a research project 
on how we think about development and how such ideas are translated into policies.
Schumpeter’s analysis of the “ideas of economists” provided complementary 
support. In his early (1912) work on the evolution of such ideas, he warned readers 
against the “intellectualist error” and argued that one of the two main roots out of 
which took shape the “science of economics”, was the “interest in practical problems 
of the day” (Schumpeter, 1954a, p. 9)2. More than 40 years later, in his monumental 
History of Economic Analysis, he took pains to distinguish “Systems of Political 
Economy”, which supported a broad set of economic policies unified by normative 
principles, such as liberalism and socialism from “pure economics” (i.e. economic 
theory as a box of tools). At a given time, such Systems tended to reflect the class 
structure of the society and the “spirit or attitudes” of the groups therein (Schum-
peter, 1964, p. 64-65). However, “pure economics” was socially embedded too. 
Schumpeter explained that the analytical endeavor is always preceded by a “vision” 
which selects the phenomena to be analyzed and identifies their relationships. Thus 
“ideology… enters on the very ground floor, into the pre-analytical cognitive act” 
and provides the start of the theory “with material provided by our vision of things” 
(ibid, p. 70). Moreover, even theories and tools which could originally be envisaged 
as “ideology-neutral” may be used as ideological artifacts in political struggles 
(ibid. p. 72). In the same book, anticipating some of the ideas of Kuhn (1970) about 
“normal science” and “scientific revolutions”, Schumpeter pointed out the role played 
by academic communities, hierarchically structured, in the reproduction and incre-
mental advance of theory, arguing that the cohesion of such communities was partly 
provided by the same attitudes towards political and social questions, a similarity 
which could not be ascribed to scientific reasons only (ibid. p. 74).
My experience as an academic, as a policy advisor and, sometimes, as a policy-
-maker had some influence in the paper too. As a consequence of such combination, 
the paper presents a political economy approach as well as a Brazilian bias.
I argue below that the collective perception of development is structured by a 
“convention”, which provides policy-makers and other social actors with a view of 
the past, present and future and with a hierarchy of problems and solutions to such 
problems. The prevalence of a convention depends on the international conditions 
faced by a society and on the distribution of economic and political power within 
2 The other root lays in the study of philosophy.
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that society. Therefore, in complex societies there is always a struggle for hegemony 
between competing development conventions.
The concept of a development convention, in terms of its cognitive and political 
economy components, as well as the evolution of such conventions, is analyzed in 
the following section. Section 3 applies the concept to the evolution of development 
conventions in the post-Second World War period, focusing on the developmental and 
neoliberal conventions. Since the latter has recently lost its power, section 4 attempts 
to answer the question about where do we stand now, arguing that there is no hege-
monic development convention at the moment – on the contrary a “stability” conven-
tion seems to prevail. The last section sums up the arguments presented in the paper.
Space and time considerations imposed selectiveness: readers are duly warned 
that development conventions of marxist inspiration are not dealt with in the paper. 
Further justification of this choice may be found in the fact that, apart from the socia-
list countries, such conventions were not hegemonic in most of the developing world.
2. ThE COnCEPT Of A DEvELOPMEnT COnvEnTIOn
I start with a time-honored distinction in development studies: development is not 
equivalent to growth. The former implies structural change, while the latter is simply 
“more of the same”. In technical parlance, development is a nonergodic process, 
where agents face ontological uncertainty, which cannot be eliminated by the search 
for more information.
Such uncertainty reduces the scope for the coordination of agents’ actions, espe-
cially of their strategies. The externalities and synergy which arise out of joint action 
are reduced and change is slower and more erratic.
Institutions provide society with means to cope with the problems of uncertainty 
and coordination. An important part of the institutional structure is composed by 
cognitive devices.
Social psychologists as Johnson (1987) have argued that moving from one point 
to the other along a “path” is one of the basic image schemata we use. Coupling “path” 
to the “scale” schemata which organizes our experience of “more” and “different” 
(ibid.) provides a metaphor of development.
As pointed out by Schön (1988), we think about social problems “in terms of 
certain pervasive, tacit generative metaphors” (p. 139, emphasis added) which are 
used for problem setting, “to describe what is wrong with the present situation in 
such a way as to set the direction for its future transformation” (p. 147). Social actors 
need some guiding rules to reduce uncertainty and induce coordination, rules which 
specify positive and negative agendas – a hierarchy of problems (e.g. inflation control, 
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income distribution) which must be tackled; solutions to such problems which are 
acceptable (e.g. inflation targeting) or not (e.g. administrative price controls), orga-
nizations in charge (e.g. the Central Bank), as well as rules and regulations (e.g. Basle 
banking rules).
The guiding power of such rules is considerably strengthened if they gain cohe-
rence through a historical metaphor – a story, a theory, which explains how the 
present arose out of the past and, especially, how the future will be if the rules are 
followed. In short, a teleology.
Such set of rules, the positive and negative agendas they generate and the teleology 
underlying them are a convention – a collective representation which structures 
individual expectations and behavior (Orléan, 1989), in the sense that, given a 
population P, we observe a behavior C which holds the following characteristics: (1) 
C is shared by all members of P; (2) every member of P believes all other members 
will follow C; (3) such belief provides members of P with a sufficient reason to adopt 
C (Orléan, 2004). A convention arises out of the interaction of social agents but it is 
external to such agents and cannot be reduced to their individual cognition, i.e. it is 
an emergent phenomenon (De Wolf and Holvoet, 2005).
In every society there are many conventions dealing with different aspects of 
economic and social behavior (e.g. the quality of traded goods, the working of the 
financial system). Following our definition, a development convention is concerned 
with structural change. This begs the question about which “structures” are to be 
changed? The answer to that question differentiates development conventions. 
However, before discussing such differences, it is convenient to consider in some 
more detail the “beliefs” which structure the convention, i.e. its cognitive content, 
and the economic and political power of the population P which holds the conven-
tion. Both elements, cognition and power, play a major role in the “strength” and 
evolution of the development conventions.
A convention is a “social representation”, defined by Jodelet (1989) as a form of 
knowledge, socially produced and shared, which has a useful objective and leads to 
the establishment of a reality which is shared by a social set. As such, it comprises a 
“hard core” and a “peripheral belt”, akin to Lakatos’ (1970) research programs3. The 
“hard core” has an axiomatic nature and plays three essential functions: to generate 
the social representation, to organize the relationships between the elements of the 
representation and to stabilize the representation by resisting changes. The “peripheral 
3 Several analysts of conventions compare them to paradigms of the Kuhnian type (Orléan, 1989; Choi, 
1993). The structural, Lakatos-type, approach used by the École du Midi group to study social representa-
tions (Jodelet, 1989; Alves-Mazzotti, 2002) is, in my view, more precise and more useful.
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belt”4 enables the hard core: it makes the hard core operational by detailing it in 
accordance to the specific circumstances at hand and thus prescribes the desirable 
and undesirable patterns of behavior. Moreover, the peripheral belt protects the hard 
core by accommodating changes in the context by means of ad hoc hypotheses and 
prescriptions.
The cognitive content of development conventions comprises codified and tacit 
knowledge. The former is provided by economics, sociology and political science and 
the latter by learning through experience and social mores and custom. Both deserve 
some more discussion.
As argued by Sá-Earp (2000), social theories are presented under several guises, 
according to the different audiences to which they are directed: there is an erudite 
version, produced by academics for consumption by their peers, a state-of-the art 
version (V1), a version designed to be used by applied social scientists (V2), an intro-
ductory version, as set in handbooks to be used by students (V3) and a highly stylized 
version for the layman use (V4), as put forward by the medias.
The transition from one version to another involves many simplifications and 
offers scope for significant misuses. This applies especially to the important (from 
the policy-making point of view) transition from V1 to V2, more so when V1 is cast 
in highly abstract and formal terms, as present-day economic theory5. Compare, for 
instance the statement of Lucas (2005, p. 301) that “equilibrium is just a property of 
the way we look at things, not a property of reality” with the ubiquitous statements of 
policy-makers about the “equilibrium interest rate” (or “exchange rate”).
I suggest that V1 is located in the hard core of the convention, V2 is used in the 
peripheral belt by decision-makers to transform general into specific proposals, V3 
performs the role of reproducing the convention: it educates people in the belief that 
V1 is “the” knowledge and enables students to use V2. Finally, V4 legitimates the 
convention by widening the number of adherents to it.
The use of scientific language and supposedly scientific knowledge in this process 
of legitimating is a powerful rhetorical instrument in modern times. The remark 
that the “justification of decisions by reference to research or investigation commit-
tees has acquired in America a symbolic-ritualistic function similar to the medieval 
practice of linking important decisions to precedents and predictions from the Holy 
Scripture” (Ezrahi, 1972, p. 217) is now applicable more widely and more strongly.
4 “Protective belt” in Lakatos’ terminology.
5 The way Lucas (2005) uses “theory” and “models” as synonyms is a good example of present-day episte-
mology and rhetoric. See the quote below, on p. 13.
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The preceding quote leads us to tacit knowledge. Development conventions are 
“stories” told about change – of how change is necessary and, especially, feasible, even 
under difficult circumstances and of how the future will be much better than the 
present if we follow the prescribed rules. Similar stories, Schon’s “tacit and pervasive 
metaphors” deeply embedded in our culture, are told by myths. In fact, the function 
of the myth is to reveal models, reducing uncertainty (Eliade, 1963)6. Although they 
may have lost their sacred meaning, some myths are metaphors which are widely 
shared in a society – they provide “stories” about change everybody knows.
Consider, for instance, a millenary myth we all know. A People is immersed in sin 
and it is leading a miserable life under the rule of the Daemon. A courageous Leader 
guided by the Doctrine given by a Deity comes, and with the help of a devoted band 
of early followers, defeats the Daemon and leads the People to a Promised Land. 
However, before reaching this wondrous place they must surmount many obstacles. 
Some of the obstacles are external (e.g. a desert), others are internal (doubts). Doub-
ters must be convinced to continue by the combination of menaces and promises. 
Many of the persons who started the journey will not end it: either because of weak-
ness or because they have backtracked and became allies of the Daemon. The latter 
must be eliminated ruthlessly. Faith and Perseverance are essential. Finally, the 
People reach the Promised Land. History (and the story) ends there.
A characteristic of myths is that they have many variations7. Fairy-tales, heard 
in our childhood, such as Sleeping Beauty and Snow White, have the same struc-
ture and content – in fact they are an off-shoot of myths related to the passing of 
seasons. The millions of viewers of the first trilogy of Star Wars saw and heard the 
same story. Readers of a Judeo-Christian culture will probably have recognized the 
story told in the previous paragraph as that presented in the Exodus chapter of the 
Bible but Romans acquainted with Virgil could have recognized in the story several 
elements of the Aeneid. As for individuals, all initiation rites (from those performed 
in Amerindian cultures to those necessary to be admitted to academic communi-
ties, such as Doctoral degrees) share some of the structural features of this myth 
(Johnson’s schemata): the path from a “bad” to a “good” situation is fraught with 
sacrifices and helped by a superior force.
A myth is no ordinary story – ancient people distinguished between “myths” (true 
stories) and “fables” (false stories) (Eliade, 1963). To be a “true” story it had to be told 
6 “Myths guarantee to Man that what he is preparing to do was previously done, they help him to chase the 
doubts he could hold about the result of his enterprise” (Ibid. p. 173, his emphasis, my translation).
7  It is not by accident that one of the classical studies of mythology is entitled The Hero of a Thousand Faces 
(Campbell, 1949). See also Calasso (1990) for a discussion of myths’ variations. 
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by someone holding special powers, a priest or a shaman. Nowadays, such sacred 
role is performed by scientists. If a version of the myth is presented under scientific 
language the original sacredness of the myth is restored and its power reinforced. The 
difficulty most people face in following the arguments presented in the more erudite 
versions of social theories (V1), enhanced by their mathematical rhetoric, increases 
their sacredness.
An integral part of mythical thinking is the belief of the initiated that they hold 
the Truth. In modern times and rhetoric the Truth is embodied in V1. Skeptics, 
which point out that the myth may reveal only part of reality, are not tolerated. At 
best they are misguided and must be enlightened, but if they persist in their doubts 
this is a clear sign of being allies of the Daemon. The politics of many academic insti-
tutions, which produce the different versions of codified knowledge, and of bureau-
cracies which put such knowledge to work, show how this operates.
All development conventions have a teleological content, which is part of their 
hard core. Such teleology has the same structure of the myths described above and is 
strongly reinforced by the tacit knowledge imparted by mythical cognition, streng-
thening the adherence to the convention. Myths tell us that change must be sweeping: 
the New World cannot come into being unless the Old World has been destroyed 
(Eliade, 1965). Similarly, development conventions purport to replace the Old World 
by a New and better World.
Not all tacit knowledge is structured as myths are. Custom, through education 
and personal experience, provides knowledge about how society operates and the 
possibilities of change it offers8. In many, probably most, societies this tacit know-
ledge has a conservative bias, which is at odds with the quick change prescribed by 
the codified knowledge. It is the role of the protective belt to try to accommodate the 
different timing of codified and tacit custom-based knowledge.
As argued above, a convention contains several cognitive elements. Its capacity to 
guide actions by stipulating positive and negative agendas – its strength – is propor-
tional to the convergence of such elements.
The strength of a convention is also proportional to the size of P and to the 
economic and political power of P members. Such strength apportions benefits to its 
adherents and sanctions to dissenters, e.g. as regards the uncertainty and profitability 
of investment decisions. As a consequence, P contains not only “true believers” but 
also “opportunists” driven by utilitarian reasons only (Choi, 1993).
8 Proverbs provide a rich material to understand the working of a society. Two Brazilian examples elucidate 
its authoritarian and clientelistic aspects: “who can commands, who is sensible obeys” and “whomever has 
a godfather does not die a pagan”.
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Although a development convention is always presented as a “national project”, 
leading to the common good, in fact it reflects the distribution of power, economic 
and political, prevailing in that society. Since development is a process of structural 
change, an efficient development convention must offer scope to emerging groups 
other than those present in the power block ruling that society, especially when the 
political regime is to some extent democratic.
In other words, development conventions play an important role in the shaping 
of political coalitions sustaining development strategies. As a consequence, their 
study pertains to the political economy realm.
A development convention tends to spread into other institutions, such as laws 
and regulations and to become embedded into organizations, such as private and 
public bureaucracies and the academia. In this sense, it is a constitutional institu-
tion. As it becomes embedded in many different institutions and organizations, the 
convention gains further strength and legitimacy. As a consequence, uncertainty is 
reduced and coordination induced. This diffusion process has strong cumulative and 
self-organization characteristics9.
An important part of this institutional spreading out is macroeconomic policy 
– fiscal, monetary and foreign exchange policies, especially. Under a development 
convention, such policies are means to achieve the ends purported by the conven-
tion – e.g. the under-valuation of the foreign exchange rate to substitute imports and 
foster local industry in the period in which the developmental convention prevailed.
The legitimacy of conventions is contingent upon their results and, if the latter 
are according to the expectations held by the members of P and P is a relevant group 
in the power hierarchy of the society, the legitimacy of the social order in which the 
conventions are inserted is strengthened. In other words, as Weber (1995) pointed 
out long ago, conventions play an important political role in the maintenance of 
social order.
Nonetheless, in complex societies, where there are many conflicting interests, no 
development convention can accommodate all. As a consequence, in such societies 
there are always different development conventions competing with the ruling 
convention. For instance, as shown in detail by Bielschowsky (1988), the prevalence 
of the developmental convention in Brazil from the fifties to the sixties, did not 
prevent liberals to uphold a different development convention and, conversely, 
during the heyday of the neoliberal convention in the same country, vocal defenders 
9 De Wolf and Hovoet (2005, p. 7) define self-organization as “a dynamic and adaptive process where systems 
acquire and maintain structure themselves, without external control”.
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of a developmental approach were heard (see Sochaczewsky [2000] on industrial 
policy and Sallum Jr [2000] on dissent within the Government).
Conversely, a convention may loose strength if its results are not according to 
the expectations of P, or if the power of P in that society diminishes, for economic 
or political reasons, generated locally or internationally. The decline of the socialist 
convention exemplifies this process well.
Development conventions arise out of the interplay of the internal economic and 
political forces with the international context and a crisis of such forces, such as the 
debt crisis of the early eighties, may prevent the incremental and cumulative process 
of change of a development convention, leading to an attack on its hard core which 
the peripheral belt cannot cope with. Under such circumstances the hegemonic 
development convention tends to plunge into a crisis and tends to be replaced by a 
new convention.
The new convention will tell a new story about the past, the present and the 
future, but, all the same, will promise a New World better than the Old10. To reach the 
new Promised Land, a new set of rules and new forms of behavior will be necessary.
As mentioned above, this process of change does not imply the disappearance 
of the superseded convention: although many of its former upholders will become 
converts to the new convention, a hard core of its supporters will retain their alle-
giance to the old convention. Such convention survival, which reflects the different 
economic and political interests present in the society, reinforces the path-dependent 
nature of the evolution of development conventions.
In other words, conventions may go through a life-cycle: they emerge, flourish 
and then may decline. In the next two sections we present an outline of the evolution 
of development conventions.
3. WhICh STRUCTURAL ChAngE? ThE LEADIng PAST 
DEvELOPMEnT COnvEnTIOnS
If we restrict our focus to the countries which emerged from the Second World War 
as providers of primary products to the more industrialized countries, what were 
then called “underdeveloped countries”, two distinct and successive answers to the 
question of structural change predominated, provided by two conventions: develop-
mental and neoliberal conventions. Because of such prevalence and its implications 
for policy-making, we concentrate our analysis on them only.
10 Variety provides breath to myths. See Calasso (1990).
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The first convention, the developmental convention, which predominated from 
the end of the Second World War to the 1970’s, focused on changing the productive 
structure by promoting industrialization. Given the economic structure inherited 
from the past and how internal and international markets functioned, State guidance 
and direct intervention were required to achieve such structural change. There were 
strong divergences about the path to be followed, ranging from Rostow (1960) “stages” 
approach, whereby the trajectory of underdeveloped countries would be akin to that 
of the more “advanced” countries, to Furtado’s (1961) assertion that trajectories 
were national-specific and about the “balanced” (Nurkse, 1953) or “unbalanced” 
(Hirschman, 1958) path of industrialization. Although the expectations about 
the role to be played by direct foreign investment varied, there was a widespread 
skepticism about its importance – development was a task of the State and of national 
entrepreneurs. Nonetheless, views converged on the objective of having a productive 
structure similar to that existent in the central capitalist countries. Although 
industrialization required changes in institutions (e.g. for planning, financing and 
protecting local industry against foreign competition) the institutional structure 
received scant attention – changes were introduced in ad hoc, haphazard fashion. 
Even the State was not scrutinized – it was largely assumed that it would benevolently 
and knowingly look after the “national interests”.
The geopolitical context of post Second World War period was an important 
determinant of this convention: the decolonization of Asia and Africa and the 
struggle for hegemony between the capitalist and socialist blocks provided ideological, 
financial and technical support to the industrialization of the LDCs. The stability 
given by the Bretton Woods system and the exceptions granted to LDCs by the 
GATT provided a congenial institutional framework. In Latin America, where formal 
political independence dated back to the beginning of the XIX century, light industry, 
supplying mainly nondurable consumers had developed during the War periods and 
the Depression, when imports had been curtailed. Most importantly, national State 
bureaucracies, committed to greater political autonomy, had evolved and viewed 
industrialization as a necessary ingredient to such goal. In Africa and Asia, the new 
State bureaucracies held the same view, albeit sometimes hampered by the lack of 
national industrial entrepreneurs.
As a result, a powerful coalition of international and local interests was formed in 
favor of industrialization. Such coalition was greatly reinforced by the international 
competition within oligopolies fighting for market shares on a global scale, following 
the reconstruction of the industrial power of Western Europe and Japan. Facing export 
barriers, producers of durable consumer goods, capital goods and intermediary 
products jumped over such obstacles establishing subsidiaries in LDCs, especially in 
those countries which had large, protected and highly profitable markets.
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High rates of urban employment, absorbing migrants from the countryside, 
coupled to the supply of durable consumer goods provided mass-support to indus-
trialization, even where political regimes became authoritarian.
Nonetheless, the V1 of the developmental convention was never fully developed. 
Although the prevailing “keynesian consensus” provided support to State interven-
tion, its hard core was not directed to issues of structural transformation of econo-
mies with the characteristics of LDCs, as Lewis (1958) pointed out. The analytical 
core of the developmental convention consisted mainly of an assembly of keynesian 
growth models, of the Harrod-Domar vintage, of analyses of the functioning of local 
and international markets and of historical analyses, following a structural-historical 
method. It was never given a full formal treatment, as Krugman (1994) regretted.
As a consequence, “development” remained the realm of applied economists and 
other social scientists. Such weakness did not prevent the elaboration of V2, as shown by 
the abundant literature on how to plan and implement industrialization. The historical 
approach to V1, which stressed the specificity of underdevelopment, further justified 
such pragmatism. In The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC) of United Nations performed a very important role in the elaboration 
and diffusion of such V2 literature, as well as in the technical education of government 
bureaucrats by short courses given locally, throughout the region and longer courses 
taught at its headquarters in Chile11. V3 versions of the convention were prepared for 
the latter purpose and were afterwards transformed into handbooks widely used. The 
media followed suit, heralding the benefits industrial “modernity” would bring.
Such convention did not go unopposed (Viner, 1958). Liberals repeatedly criti-
cized the developmental convention on three main grounds: excessive State interven-
tion, interfering thus with market mechanisms; a tendency to autarky, depriving the 
economy of the benefits of foreign trade, direct investment and finance and, finally 
the priority attached to industry, especially when coupled to protectionism related 
to trade, investment and finance. The result of such combination was, they claimed, 
inefficiency – slow growth and inflation.
Nonetheless, in many countries in Latin America, such as Mexico and Brazil, the 
developmental convention followed its path-dependent trajectory until the crises of 
the seventies and eighties, when the hard core of the convention – industrialization 
under State intervention – became untenable, paving the way for the hegemony of 
the liberal convention.
11 Local graduate education was very limited as were scholarships for studying abroad.
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The economic and political processes which led to such outcome are well known: 
the crisis of the socialist system in Europe and China, the debt crisis of some of the 
main followers of the developmental convention, such as Mexico and Brazil, which, 
coupled to inflation, crippled the legitimacy of the developmental State, the crisis of 
fordism and the welfare state in the central capitalist countries, the liberalization of 
international trade and finance and the coming to power of conservative forces repre-
sented by leaders such as Reagan, Thatcher and Kohl. The demise of the “keynesian 
consensus” and its replacement by the renewed faith in the market, supported by the 
revolution of rational expectations, methodological individualism and the “invasion” 
of political science and sociology by economics, discussed below, provided the episte-
mological support to the conservative tsunami which swept the world.
During the eighties the developmental convention was superseded by another – 
the neoliberal convention, which was symmetrically opposite to the old convention 
on every ground.
Norberto Bobbio has argued that “the whole history of political thought is domi-
nated by a great dichotomy: organicism (holism) and individualism (atomism)” 
(Bobbio, 1990, p. 45). Such dichotomy can be extended to economic theories as well. 
Dobb, for instance, divides the latter into two groups, of which the first starts “the 
study of Political Economy and the analysis of exchange-value” from “the socioeco-
nomic conditions that shaped the class relations of society” and the second which 
“derive an explanation of exchange-value from the attitudes of individual consumers 
towards commodities as use-values catering for the satisfaction of individual wants” 
(Dobb, 1973, p. 31-33). More generally, Caporaso and Levine (1992) argue that the 
term “economic” has at least two meanings. One of them refers to “activities”, especially 
the production and reproduction of goods and their circulation, which, in turn, leads 
to focus “on the system or structure of reproduction of the society as a whole, or at least 
of that aspect of society tied to satisfying wants” (p. 25). In contrast, “economic” may be 
identified with a way of understanding 
human action as an effort to achieve given ends in the face of external constraints… 
The central metaphor is allocation…When we identify the economic with a way of 
calculating, we immediately place emphasis on the mental processes of the indivi-
dual agent who does the calculation… Indeed, it becomes a way of thinking about 
all of our activities. (Caporaso and Levine, 1992, p. 22-23, emphasis in the original)
From the viewpoint of the dichotomy above, the developmental convention was 
situated in the first half, as shown by its emphasis on the structure of productive acti-
vities and social classes, while the neoliberal convention draws its inspiration from 
the individualistic tradition of liberal thinking.
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The neoliberal convention faced different conditions from the developmental 
convention as regards V1. It could rely on a highly structured analytical frame, which 
fed directly into the other versions of the convention. From the new classical school 
micro foundations based on rational expectations, it garnered the suspicion that the 
State is unreliable because of the “inflationary bias” induced by electoral conside-
rations as well as inefficient because agents anticipate what the State will do. From 
the public choice and coalition theories came the assertion that the State is prone to 
capture by private interests and by its own bureaucracy, leading to rent-seeking stra-
tegies which jeopardize efficiency and growth – as a consequence the State is not only 
inefficient but positively harmful, the solution being to reduce the scope for State 
intervention and, when this is inevitable, to insulate the bureaucracies, to make their 
decision process transparent and the decision makers accountable for what they do, 
the independence of the Central Bank being a prime example of such general conclu-
sions. Stemming from endogenous growth theory, technical progress, transferred 
from the more advanced countries by means of direct investment and trade, became 
a prime objective and the neo-classical variety of the “new institutional economics” 
argued that institutions which guaranteed private property rights were essential to 
foster innovation and reduce transaction costs. Methodological individualism and 
universal institutionalism provided the coherence of such theoretical structure and 
endogenous growth theory aimed at getting “a single model neoclassical model that 
can account for rich and poor countries in the same terms. This contrasts with the 
view we had in the 1960s that there was one theory for the advanced countries and 
some other model was needed for the Third World” (Lucas, 2005 p. 308).
International institutions, especially the World Bank, with the help of the 
academia and a wide array of private institutions, from consultants to banks and 
risk-assessment agencies, transformed such theory into V2, summarized by the 
Washington Consensus Decalogue, implemented through the Structural Adjust-
ment Programs and the conditionality of the Brady Plan debt renegotiations. The 
overwhelming hegemony of the new orthodoxy in the academia was quickly trans-
formed into handbooks and the national and international media adhered enthusias-
tically to the liberal convention, proclaiming the coming of an “emergent modernity”. 
The rhetorical fate of the expression “Third World” expresses this well: what was, 
under the developmental convention, a proud proclamation of cultural and political 
autonomy, became, under the neoliberal convention a synonym for poverty and low-
-quality products and services.
Modern versions of the Promised Land myth can be found in the two develop-
ment conventions but it is more structured in the neoliberal convention: try repla-
cing “sin” by “inflation and inefficiency”, the Leader by the World Bank, the Daemon 
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by the State and rent-seekers, the Desert by the darwinian weeding out of inefficient 
institutions and the Promised Land by post-historical societies.
The new convention focused on institutional change, aiming at reestablishing 
the primacy of market institutions by, on the one hand, reducing and controlling 
State intervention, increasing the rights of property and, on the other hand, increa-
sing the openness of the economy to trade, investment and finance flows. As such, 
it was a highly selective institutional change, focused on making the markets func-
tion12. Changes in the productive structure, led by foreign investment, would follow 
the change in institutions in accordance to “comparative advantages”.
The former development agenda was overturned. “Picking the winners” and 
sector-specific industrial policies became mortal sins. “Get the institutions right” 
became the development mantra.
The “right institutions” were patterned upon Western capitalist democracies, and 
they could, it was supposed, be applied urbi et orbi. As a consequence the process of 
institutional reform was a “universal consensus”. Having got the “right” institutions, 
it was claimed, the economic and political structures of all countries would present a 
similar pattern – an economy ruled by the market and a liberal-democratic polity. No 
better alternative was available and, therefore, History, led by ideas, would end there.
The case of some asian countries, such as Korea and Taiwan, where high and 
sustained growth and low inflation were combined with strong State intervention, 
including authoritarian regimes, posed an obvious problem to such interpretation of 
development. The conundrum of the “East Asia miracle” was “solved” by the World 
Bank (1993), which argued that the importance of State intervention is such coun-
tries was not clear and that, in any case, it had been “market-friendly”. Moreover, the 
Bank strenuously advised readers that the experience of such countries was not repli-
cable. The heterodoxy of such cases was thus disposed of.
The initial success of the neoliberal convention in reducing high and sustained 
inflation provided it with great popular support. The political consequences of such 
support were duly acknowledged, strengthening the adhesion of the State and poli-
tical parties to the convention. The maintenance of price stability through over-valued 
exchange rates and high interest rates established a powerful coalition between the 
monetary authorities, importers, the financial system and higher-income groups. 
Opening the economies to trade, investment and finance reinforced such coalition. 
In most cases, foreign investors benefited considerably from the privatization of State 
enterprises. Although the State duly enhanced propriety rights, strengthening the 
12 To give but an example: individual rights were reduced to property rights, assuming that the other rights 
(political, social) would follow from the former.
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coalition, other structural State reforms, such as the fiscal, administrative, political 
and labor legislation reforms faced incumbent interests and actors and tended to 
stall, leading to demands for “second generation” institutional reforms.
4. WhERE DO WE STAnD nOW?
The neoliberal convention, in its full-fledged form, has been superseded too. The days 
in which Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of History” and Williamson dubbed the 
Washington Consensus the “Universal Consensus” which “summarized the common 
core of wisdom embraced by all serious economists” are long past13. Gone are also the 
laundry-lists of institutional reforms to be applied everywhere to promote “good gover-
nance” and thus to transform Zambia into Sweden overnight. “Big bangs” lost their gilt. 
The fact that the world evolved so differently from what was predicted proved that the 
story told by the neoliberal convention was no myth, it was simply a fable.
The retreat of the liberal convention can be partly ascribed to the cognitive debate, 
as alternative approaches, such the neoschumpeterian, post-keynesian and neokeyne-
sian in economics and theories of State embeddedness in politics have recovered some 
ground. Formal treatment of market failures, pointed out in nonmathematical terms 
by early development economists – such as indivisibilities and information asym-
metry – have provided academic legitimacy to such factors. Nonetheless, the agnos-
ticism presently prevailing in development theories seems to indicate that a new V1 is 
still in the making. In fact, most of the criticism leveled at the Washington Consensus, 
spearheaded by highly visible and legitimated actors such as Joseph Stiglitz, has been 
directed to the V2 version of the neoliberal convention. Although the media has 
conveyed such criticism, its influence on V3 seems to be still limited.
Nonetheless, the neo-liberal convention was superseded mostly by reality: by the 
international crises of the nineties, the failure of showcases such as Argentina and the 
success of heterodox paths of development followed by China, India and Vietnam, 
among others and by the limited growth developing countries achieved under the 
hegemony of the neoliberal convention. In fact, as Chang (2007) has pointed out, 
the per capita growth of developing countries during the neoliberal period was about 
half of the growth of the sixties and seventies, when such countries were following 
the developmental convention.
Given its results, the demise of such convention should be commemorated. But 
what is the alternative?
13 See Fukuyama (1989) and Williamson (1993, p. 1.334).
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The recent Growth Report – Strategies for Sustained Growth and Inclusive Develo-
pment (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008), probably is a good repre-
sentative of the present day orthodoxy about development – the Commission which 
prepared the Report was composed of “19 leaders, mostly from developing countries” 
(p. vii), including two Nobel Prize winning economists and the Report is the result of 
two years work, over which 12 workshops were held and “more than 300 distingui-
shed academics wrote and presented papers and discussed the issues” (p. viii). The 
Report is sponsored by the World Bank and by several developed countries institu-
tions concerned with development.
The general conclusions about growth are based on the study of 13 “success stories 
of sustained high growth”: a very heterogeneous group, ranging from diamond-rich 
Botswana to China and Japan14. Although the Report duly recognizes the heteroge-
neity of the success stories, it is worth stressing that none, with the possible excep-
tion of Hong Kong, fits the neoliberal paradigm. Moreover, the inclusion of Brazil 
among the successes is due to its growth record during the developmental years, 
before neoliberal reforms were introduced. In other words, following development 
strategies different from those sponsored by the neoliberal convention has become 
respectable, a rhetorical trick similar to that performed be the East Asia Miracle in 
the early nineties.
The Report identifies (p. 21) “five striking points of resemblance [between the 
success stories]:
1. They fully exploited the world economy.
2. They maintained macroeconomic stability.
3.  Mustered high rates of saving and investment.
4. They let markets allocate resources.
5. They had committed, credible and capable governments.”
However, when the Report turns to the “policy ingredients of growth strategies” 
it presents a remarkable caution, as shown by the caveats that “we do not know the 
sufficient conditions for growth” (ibid. p. 33) and “our model of developing econo-
mies is too primitive at this stage to make it wise to predefine what governments 
should do” (p. 30) to conclude that “just as we cannot say this list [of policies] is suffi-
cient, we cannot say for sure that all ingredients are necessary”(p. 33). Such caution 
pervades the whole document.
Diversity, a hallmark of some of the old developmental convention versions, has 
made a comeback: countries follow different trajectories. Institutions change gradually, 
14 The other countries are: Brazil, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Oman, Singapore, Taiwan 
and Thailand. 
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the polity plays an important role in institutional change, institutions may be formally 
identical and operate differently depending on their context. The State has important 
roles to play. Political economy is back, “history matters”, path-dependency and cumu-
lativeness are important. Even “industrial policy”, that bad word, has had a reprieve by 
none less than the World Bank (2007).
However, behind the recognition of diversity and the caution about general 
recipes, lies, unabated, the belief in the need for “sound fundamentals”. This is an 
expression with strong rhetorical power (as was “rational” expectations) because 
nobody is in favor of “unsound” fundamentals (or “irrational” expectations). The 
problem lies in how one defines “soundness”.
As we know, the canonical answer now is fiscal equilibrium, low inflation and 
flexible exchange rate. The rationale of this policy is well-known: price stability is a 
condition for sustainable growth. Stability creates an environment in which relative 
prices play their allocation role efficiently, fiscal and private accounting systems are 
trustworthy and long term contracts and funding can be signed in confidence. In 
other words, the objectives of stability and growth are complementary. The Central 
Banks have become the high priests of this canon and to fulfill their role they must 
be free and independent15.
Price stability, says the canon, is best achieved by inflation targeting: the Central 
Bank has an inflation target (normally a narrow band) and uses all its instruments 
(mainly the prime interest rate) to achieve such goal. Fiscal policy targets are set so as to 
allow for the public debt payment entailed by the interest rate set by the Central Bank. 
The foreign exchange rate is left free to fluctuate, but not too much upwards, since this 
will increase the price of tradables and, therefore, threaten the intended inflation rate. 
Ideally, the Central Bank should be legally independent to establish the inflation target. 
Under a second best solution, the Bank acts as the agent of the political authorities (e.g. 
the Finance Ministry): the latter establish the target and the Bank pursues it as it deems 
necessary. In any case, the Central Bank enjoys full operational autonomy but is bound 
by transparency and accountability institutional instruments.
The target set by the Central Bank is supposed to provide an “anchor” to the 
expectations of private agents. Since the latter hold rational expectations and know 
how the Bank will react to price increases, they will avoid raising prices.
Given soundness and a well working price mechanism, growth will follow suit. If it 
doesn’t it is either because some institutions are not working properly (each case is now 
different) and/or because poor information leads the agents to hold bad expectations 
15 See Artus (2007) for the views of Central Banks of developed countries and Bevilaqua et al. (2007) for 
the Brazilian Central Bank. All subscribe to the same credo.
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about inflation. To remedy the former, introduce institutional reform (bearing in mind 
the context). As for the latter, stick to your guns and keep firing until expectations 
change and a new trajectory is established. It takes time but, as one humorist has put it, 
“in the end all will be well and if it is not well yet it is because it has not ended”.
Therefore, we have a “soundness” convention, with all its attributes. But, is it a 
development convention? In so far as development is interpreted as implying struc-
tural change and a long term prospective, the answer is negative. The developmental 
convention focused on changes in the productive structure, the neoliberal conven-
tion on the institutional structure. Both had a long term horizon. Notwithstanding its 
importance, macroeconomic policy was a means to turn a specific vision of society 
into reality. The “sound” fundamentalists draw their convention from the same V1 of 
the neoliberal convention and both share the faith on the market and the mistrust of 
the State. Nonetheless, the former focus on stability and their convention looks, at 
best, at the near future only. Macroeconomic policy has become an objective by itself. 
It is an essentially conservative convention: the Central Bank wants to preserve price 
stability, the financial system and high-income groups want to preserve their high 
earnings and their freedom of action16.
The strength of the “sound fundamentals” convention and the role played in it 
by Central Banks are not fortuitous: the convention seems to be a response to the 
instability of the capitalist system provoked by uncontrolled international financial 
capital, to the increasing integration of “emergent” countries into this system and to 
the increased power of financial capital.
The increasing complexity of the global development agenda, with the forceful 
inclusion of issues related to the environment and the related scarcity of food, raw 
materials and energy as well as to poverty and migration, coupled to the lack of 
answers to such problems, has probably increased the bent towards a more restricted 
and conservative agenda. If this is the case, decision-makers are following the ostrich 
convention – to bury the head into the short-term to avoid uncertainty.
Nonetheless, doubts have been creeping into this stronghold too. The Report, in its 
typical style of confirming the orthodoxy and, then, introducing caveats, states that “no 
economy can flourish in the midst of macroeconomic instability” but then admonishes 
that “Economists and policy-makers, however, disagree about the precise definition 
of stability and the best way to preserve it” and that “fiscal and monetary rules need 
to be left with an element of ‘creative ambiguity’ ” (p. 53-54). The same pattern is to be 
found in the analysis of Ben Bernanke, a commentator above suspicion of heterodoxy. 
16 The brazilian case presents an extreme case of the working of such convention. See Bruno (2007) and 
Erber (2008).
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After stating that “price stability… is a good thing in itself ” and that “in the long term, 
low inflation promotes growth, efficiency and stability – which, all else being equal, 
support maximum sustainable employment”, he goes on to admit that “measuring 
the long-term relationship between growth or productivity and inflation is difficult”, 
settling for a minimalist proposition – “I think we can agree that, at minimum, the 
opposite proposition – that inflationary policies promote growth in the long run – has 
been entirely discredited” (Bernanke, 2007, p. 1-2). To such cautious remarks should 
be added his plea for using “an analytical framework that involves learning by private 
agents and possibly the central bank as well” and his assessment that the Federal 
Reserve forecasting “continues to involve art as well as science” (ibid., p. 3-6).
The present crisis, which, at the time of writing (october 2008), is still unfolding, 
will probably lead to deep changes in the prevailing modes of thought of social scien-
tists and to changes in the economic and political power distribution. So far, it has put 
an end to the faith in the self-regulation capability of markets and has put the State back 
as a central institution for the survival of the capitalist system. It has also brought to 
light to developing countries the downside of their international financial integration. 
The evolution so far observable (at least by the author) does not provide yet for a new 
development convention. In fact, the crisis will probably focus attention on the main-
tenance of stability. Even if fiscal equilibrium may loose its axiomatic weight, maintai-
ning “sound fundamentals” is likely to retain overarching importance. Nonetheless, 
given the roles fulfilled by a development convention, a new convention will arise. As 
I have argued in more detail at a previous ISS Conference I think a cross-fertilization 
of the post-keynesian and neoschumpeterian research programmes could provide a 
useful starting point (Erber, 2004).
5. COnCLUSIOnS
I have argued that a “development convention” is a constitutional institution, shaped 
by epistemology and political economy elements, which serves as a device to reduce 
uncertainty and increase coordination of economic and political actors by esta-
blishing a hierarchy of problems and solutions. Development conventions are an 
emergent phenomenon, with strong self-organization features, which present an 
evolutionary path-dependent trajectory with incremental and cumulative changes 
introduced in its peripheral belt, until a crisis undermines their hard core and they 
are replaced by a new convention. After reviewing the evolution of the two develo-
pment conventions which prevailed after the Second World War, the present time is 
characterized by the absence of a hegemonic development convention and the preva-
lence of stability preoccupations. The crisis now under way will probably usher into 
a new development convention.
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